

VZCZCXYZ0001  
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0495/01 2551229  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 121229Z SEP 07  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1172  
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T USNATO 000495

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017

TAGS: PREL NATO PINR KACT RU

SUBJECT: ALLIES EMBRACE A/S ROOD READOUT OF US-RUSSIA MD TALKS

REF: USNATO 490

Classified By: AMB V. NULAND; REASONS 1.4 (A) (B) (C) (G) AND (H).

1.(S) Summary: NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Allies warmly welcomed A/S for International Security and Non-Proliferation Affairs John Rood's Sept. 11 immediate read-out on the U.S.-Russian Sept. 10 Missile Defense (MD) talks in Paris (septel). Allies seemed neither surprised nor overly concerned by the reported "cool" tone of the Russian delegation and praised the U.S. for transparency, commitment to pressing Moscow for a cooperative approach, maintaining open to NATO and NATO-Russia roles in various cooperative options and providing Allies with technical insights to respond to and refute a "barrage" of Russian MD technical pitches which they are receiving. Allied Permanent Representatives (PermReps) looked forward to the October 1 reinforced NAC/NRC MD meetings to continue the consultations with MD experts present. End Summary.

12. (S-REL NATO) A/S Rood briefed Allied PermReps and the NATO SYG Sept. 11 on the Sept. 10 U.S.-Russian MD talks, reminding them these talks followed on an earlier set of talks in July and would continue with at least another round in Moscow at the expert level on or about Oct. 10 followed directly by the two-plus-two Foreign and Defense Ministerial talks. A/S Rood led the U.S. delegation and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak led a Russian delegation which also included MOD's LTGEN Buzhinskiy and SVR General Venetsev. A/S Rood explained that the talks had three basic elements: comparative analysis of the threat, U.S. MD program capabilities and possible cooperation options.

THREAT EXCHANGE

---

13. (S - REL NATO) Throughout the briefing, A/S Rood underscored U.S. efforts to take Russian concerns seriously and address them point by point. The U.S. threat briefing covered the North Korean (DPRK) and Iranian ballistic missile programs, transfers of systems and technology between the two countries, and the general missile proliferation environment among roughly two dozen countries with missile efforts. Russia only presented an assessment of the Iranian indigenous ballistic missile program and downplayed the possibilities of transfers of missile technology from the DPRK or the availability of such technologies and components globally. The U.S. presentation noted the DPRK's advancing program led by Taepo Dong multi-stage long-range missiles and BM- 25's, their history of non-traditional development methods (which could allow leap frogs in development which are hard to predict), past cases of transfers of technology and whole systems, including to Iran (such as the case of the BM-25

missile transfer, which now has been made releasable to Allies at the NATO SECRET level - reftel - and on Sept. 10 was briefed to Russia) and the general DPRK perspective of seeing ballistic missile sales as a cash cow. Russia, on the other hand, claimed Iran only had SCUD-family technology with limited range, could not master improvements on it (no engine clustering to bolster range, e.g.), and did not agree that the BM-25 missile had been transferred to Iran. They further claimed that any major Iranian advancements would be visible in testing which they had yet to see, adding that testing would give two to three-year warning times for fielding of MD systems.

#### U.S. MD Program capabilities

-----

4. (S - REL NATO) A/S Rood, noting earlier Russian concerns about the ability of the U.S. interceptor and radar sites proposed for the Czech Republic and Poland, told Allies that the U.S. made technical presentations to the Russians which demonstrated that such U.S. systems could not adequately track a Russian inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched at the U.S. into the post-burn phase where its target trajectory could be determined in time to permit interceptors in Poland to intercept it. The U.S. also demonstrated that the Czech-based radar, because of the earth's curvature, could not observe the Russian missile test range at Plesetsk for intelligence-gathering purposes, another previously-raised Russian concern. Again responding to another previous Russian assertion that placement of the interceptor site and radar in European locations other than in the Czech Republic and Poland (Russia mentioned UK, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey as alternatives) would be of less concern, the U.S. showed how the Czech/Polish architecture optimizes coverage of the U.S. and as much territory of NATO Allies as possible. In later discussions with Allies, A/S Rood also noted that Russian presentations at the NRC and in earlier bilateral talks attributed greater capabilities to U.S. sea-based systems than was accurate, noting that they would not be an effective alternative to ground-based interceptors.

#### Cooperation

-----

15. (S - REL NATO) Underlining a serious U.S. commitment to pursuing MD cooperation with Russia, on both a bilateral and possibly NATO/NATO-Russia track, A/S Rood noted that the U.S. laid out high and low-end cooperation paths for Russia. He said that Russia was offered the opportunity to focus now on radar, threat fusion and warning information cooperation (Qabala, Armavir radar/U.S. X-Band and other sensor systems), with both Moscow and Brussels-based centers as possibilities, to develop cooperative systems which it need not portray or consider as MD systems, but as cooperative radar and threat monitoring capabilities. A/S Rood also explained that possible regional MD architectures with inter-connected command and control, radar, interceptors, and command and control could be pursued, again with bilateral, Allied and NATO-Russia versions which could be configured. Russia's reaction was "brusque," he said, but they committed to study the ideas seriously and respond at a later date. Kislyak also underlined that proposals made by President Putin were only an alternative to the U.S.-proposed European MD element, not an addition. Russia clearly said that suspending or freezing the U.S. bilateral talks with Poland and the Czech Republic was a precondition for deeper exploration of possible U.S.- Russian cooperative avenues.

#### Allied Reactions

-----

6. (C- REL NATO) Allied reactions were extensive and generally reflected interest in: 1) possible motivations or explanations underpinning differing U.S.-Russian threat perceptions; 2) Russian future intentions toward exploring cooperation; 3) a possible role for verification/transparency

measures to address Russian concerns; 4) whether there was a way ahead on U.S.-Russian strategic talks; and 5) how NATO, NATO-Russia channels figure in current U.S. MD thinking.

7.(C - REL NATO) Responding to questions from Canada, Spain and Luxembourg, A/S Rood explained that Russia seemed to have a threat assessment of Iranian capabilities and intentions that did not credit the effect of foreign assistance in the same manner as the U.S. They also did not show an interest in exploring the DPRK program or its transfer tendencies in the context of discussing the Iranian ballistic missile program. A/S Rood said that Russian responses and tactics in the threat exchanges suggested a political interest in downplaying the reach and pace of development of the Iranian threat and an unwillingness to delve into the proliferation risks and analytical challenges posed by widely-accepted understanding of the scope of missile technology exchange in the grey market. A/S Rood also clarified that while the U.S. was pleased with progress at the Six-Party Talks, the agreement to date did not cover the DPRK missile arsenal nor foreclose the avenue of foreign assistance to Iran from the DPRK.

8.(C - REL NATO) In response to multiple Allies (Norway, Germany and Portugal), on Moscow's attitude toward prospects for future cooperation, A/S Rood said Russia's attitude had BQQQf;QQ+Q measures), Kislyak in these talks had not raised or shown interest in such steps. He also had not raised the Bulgarian-posed question of limiting the azimuth coverage

of the Czech radar to assuage Russian concerns.

Additionally, Moscow had declined the U.S. request to visit the Armavir radar site, however it was working with the U.S and Azerbaijan to facilitate a Qabala site visit later this month. This was complicating U.S. efforts to assess the radar cooperation proposal which President Putin generally raised at the Kennebunkport summit.

¶10. (C - REL NATO) Responding to questions from Spain, the Netherlands, and Hungary, A/S Rood confirmed that the U.S. and Russia in other channels were conducting talks on extending the START Treaty, and that the Russians in these recent MD talks had not raised withdrawal from, or the future of, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. INF withdrawal, however, had been a U.S.-Russian discussion several years ago and the U.S. had declined the suggestion of withdrawing from the treaty as Moscow proposed. Responding to Poland, A/S Rood said that the recent Russian statements about U.S. MD facilities in Europe crossing a Russian red line were not constructive, as were previous public Russian comments about targeting MD facilities with missiles. A/S Rood said that Russia had said in earlier discussions that part of its concern about the U.S. European MD facilities related to perceived diminished options in a nuclear second-strike scenario, but the U.S. had found this unconvincing and had told Kislyak so because the most likely Russian strategic systems to figure in such a scenario were sea and mobile land-based systems, which would not be affected by interceptors in Poland. He also said that the U.S. had addressed Russian concerns about possible multiple vehicles on the European-based interceptors noting that the system design prohibited using kill vehicles to attack hundreds of missiles. Such kill vehicles were designed to help the same interceptor have a higher probability of successfully intercepting the warhead when mixed with other objects, such as missile shrouds, a simple decoy or large post-burn phase debris.

¶11. (C- REL NATO) Finally, A/S Rood affirmed real U.S. interest in both NATO and NATO-Russia cooperative elements as modifications of the cooperative options offered to Kislyak. When asked by Canada about how U.S. Congressional budget consideration might affect possible NATO or NATO-Russia cooperation possibilities, A/S Rood said that Congress was still working on authorization and appropriations bills, but had stressed the need to complete U.S. bilateral talks with Prague and Warsaw.

¶12. (SBU) A/S Rood cleared this cable.  
NULAND